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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET


SUBJECT: (Optional) Physical Security Strategy Paper 				
FROM: Chief, Policy and Plans Staff/OS 		EXTENSION 	NO. OS 8-5625	
			DATE 8 August 1988	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. EO/OS	8/8/88			<p>To #1: D/L to CCISCM in COB 10 August.</p> <p>Please return to me for hand carrying to PTS.</p> <p>Thunder</p> <p></p> <p>OK - </p> <p>25X1</p> <p>25X1</p>
2. DD/PTS	8/8	8/3		
3. D/OS	8/14/88			
4. OS/Registry				
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FORM 1-79

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USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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Washington, D.C. 20505

16 AUG 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO)

FROM: [REDACTED]
Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency

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SUBJECT: Physical Security Strategy Paper [REDACTED]

At the 3 August 1988 meeting of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures(Policy) [IG/CM(P)], Mr. Craig Alderman, Jr., Chairman, requested member agencies and departments provide to CCISCMO written comments on the "Program Strategy Paper" prepared by the Physical Security Subcommittee. CIA comments are set forth below. [REDACTED]

1. The need for common standards is fundamental, and the program suggested by the Subcommittee should move us in the right direction and focus attention on an area that has been neglected for a number of years. However, funding sources beyond the initial phase will, most likely, be scarce. [REDACTED]

2. As with any successful program, management is the key. We have no objection to the Chairman, Physical Security Subcommittee, managing the startup phase to identify available seed money [REDACTED] select an appropriate contractor, and set other preliminary taskings which the initial phase may dictate. [REDACTED]


3. However, integral to initial planning should be the selection of a specific organization to manage the program over the long term. We would recommend strongly that central management reside with an "executive agent," such as the Department of Defense, to ensure the program receives line management direction and perspective. Also, given the magnitude of physical security applications within the DoD network, vesting program leadership within the Department would seem prudent. [REDACTED]

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4. Although not addressed in the strategy paper, an item for consideration is the need for interface between program goals and the DCI's newly created Security Evaluation Office. Common and, possibly, overlapping interests would suggest the need for close coordination between the two activities.

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!OS/PPS/[redacted] (8 Aug 88)!

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!Distribution:!

! Orig - Adse)!

- ! 1 - D/OS Chrono!
- ! 1 - PPS Chrono!
- ! (1) - OS Registry!

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